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Abstract 
We study how economic crises affect the likelihood of regime change brought about, in part or 
fully, by actors in the incumbent regime. While historically common, such processes remain far 
less studied than regime transitions forced by non-incumbent actors, such as coups or 
revolutions. We argue that economic crises may incentivize leaders to change the regime “from 
within” due to two different mechanisms, which we detail and illustrate with two cases. First, 
crises create “windows of opportunity” for leaders to change the regime in a direction they 
inherently prefer. Democratically elected leaders who use crises to conduct self-coups is one 
example. Second, economic crises sometimes allow for opposition actors to mobilize and 
threaten the regime with breakdown. In such circumstances, incumbents may prefer to change 
the regime from within to appease opponents in anticipation of even worse outcomes. We 
leverage new data on the timing and mode of regime change for more than 2000 regimes from 
about 200 countries, across 1789–2018, and find support for the hypothesis that economic crises 
induce transitions from within. However, when we distinguish incumbent-guided liberalization 
episodes from other guided transitions, including self-coups, we only find that economic crises 
systematically relate to the latter. 
1 Introduction
Large-n empirical analysis of regime change are abundant in comparative politics, especially
those that consider transitions between regimes with democratic and autocratic charac-
teristics (e.g., Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003). But, there are also growing empirical
literatures that instead focus on distinct modes of breakdown and related processes of regime
change, especially changes being forced by actors external to the incumbent regime. Such
actors could be large groups of citizens or smaller groups of military officers driving pro-
cesses of, respectively, popular uprisings/revolutions (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011;
Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2014) or coups d’e´tat (e.g., Powell
and Thyne, 2011; Powell, 2012; Olar, 2019). These literatures have generated empirically
based insights into how and when regimes die. One key determinant of both successful
popular revolutions (Knutsen, 2014) and coups (Gassebner, Gutmann and Voigt, 2016) is
economic crisis, typically operationalized in the literature as slow or even negative growth
in GDP per capita (p.c.) within a restricted time-frame, typically a year.1
In this paper, we develop the argument that economic crises also spur processes of regime
change that originate from “within” the regime. As we detail in Section 3, we define regimes
as the formal and informal rules that are essential for selecting leaders. Regime transitions
from within are therefore defined as substantial changes to these rules that are, at least in
part, guided by regime incumbents. These regime changes include, first, liberalization pro-
cesses of previously autocratic regimes, managed by incumbent regime elites. One example
is the guided process of democratization in Spain after Franco’s death. Second, “transitions
from within” include other incumbent-guided transition processes not accompanied by sub-
1Also the large literatures on all regime transitions from autocracy to democracy, or vice versa, find that
economic crises are conducive to regime transitions. For example, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that
slow short-term GDP p.c. growth increase transitions both to and from democracy (see also, e.g., Kennedy,
2010; Ciccone, 2011; Aidt and Leon, 2015). Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018) find that slow growth
increases the chances of autocratic regimes breaking down, more generally (i.e., not only when leading to
democratic transitions), although the relationship depend on the incumbent regime’s institutional structure.
Likewise, Khrishnarajan (2019) finds that the negative relationship between crisis and irregular leader exits
in autocracies is context-dependent, and strongly moderated by natural resources income. Further, several
studies suggest that high inflation, another measure of economic crisis, increase the risk of democratic
breakdown, at least in certain time periods and institutional contexts (Gasiorowski, 1995; Gasiorowski and
Power, 1998; Bernhard, Nordstrom and Reenock, 2001). Going beyond regime change, systematic studies
find that economic crises affect several other outcomes associated with political stability, more broadly,
ranging from government change in democracies (Lindvall, 2017) to civil war onset (Hegre and Sambanis,
2006).
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stantial liberalization, such as managed changes from a military regime ruled by a junta to
an institutionalized one-party autocracy or to a personalized dictatorship (Geddes, Wright
and Frantz, 2018). One such guided transition occurred in post-Mao China in 1982, when
the Communist Party approved a new constitution that, e.g., introduced term limits on
leaders. Finally, transitions from within include self-coups, where a sitting, democratically
elected leader concentrates power in his/her own hands under a more autocratic regime
(Svolik, 2015). One example is the imposition of Martial Law in the Philippines in 1972, by
President Ferdinand Marcos. While different in many respects, these regime changes have
in common that the process of transforming the regime is, at least to some extent, managed
by representatives of the sitting regime. We hypothesize that such regime changes are more
likely to occur once a country experiences economic crisis.
Scholars have highlighted that incumbent elites are often part of negotiating transitions
from autocracy to democracy, and that the outcomes of such negotiations affect the type
of regime that emerges (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986) and policy outcomes
under the new regime (Albertus and Menaldo, 2018). Yet, by focusing on (various kinds of)
incumbent-guided regime transitions, and theoretically and empirically scrutinizing the link
between economic crises and such transitions, this paper makes important contributions to
the literature on regime change. In fact, we are not aware of any existing large-n study
that exclusively focuses on processes of regime change from within and determinants of such
changes.2 This lack of empirical studies is not due to regime changes from within being rare
phenomena—for large parts of modern history, such changes have outpaced regime changes
generated by, for instance, military coups or popular revolutions (see Section 3). Instead, the
missing empirical studies, we surmise, are due to the previous lack of comprehensive data on
these particular changes. This situation has changed with the new “Historical Regime Data”
(HRD; Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2019), embedded in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017a,b). We employ these data—which include more than 2000
2The recent work on “Gamed Democracy” by Albertus and Menaldo (e.g., 2018) is related. But, these
authors focus on democratic transitions rather than dealing with any kind of regime change, and only indi-
rectly consider the guided nature of transitions, empirically, by coding the continuation of constitutions from
autocracy to democracy. Their argument highlights the relevance of incumbent autocratic elites negotiating
or even leading the transition to democracy, thereby designing the new democratic system so that they have
considerable decision-making power.
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political regimes and about 700 regime changes from within, drawn from 201 countries and
the years 1789–2018—in our empirical analysis below.
In contrast with the lack of large-n empirical studies, several theoretical contributions
have been made on the dynamics of regime changes from within (e.g., Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2006; Boix, 2003; Svolik, 2012), generating several intriguing hypotheses. Among them
is that economic crises spur (at least specific forms of) regime changes from within. While
often discussed as an argument predicting a relationship between economic crisis and pop-
ular revolution (see, e.g., Doorsch and Maarek, 2014), the core formal model of Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006) implies the discussed hypothesis; anticipating revolutionary action
during times of crisis, incumbent elites will often pre-empt such enforced transitions by
initiating a guided liberalization that, in turn, diffuses the popular threat. In-depth case
studies—on regimes drawn from a wide variety of regions and historical time periods (see,
e.g., Berger and Spoerer, 2001; Morales and McMahon, 1996; Bratton and van de Walle,
1997a)—have also elaborated how economic crises spur not only uprisings and revolutions,
but also engender regime changes from within. Thus, our empirical study informs an already
large theoretical and case study literature on the topic, and allows for testing prominent
hypotheses on extensive data material.
But, why would incumbents accept changes to their current regimes, and why would
they be more likely to do so after an economic crisis? By further detailing, developing and
synthesizing notions from the existing theoretical and case study literatures, we argue that
economic crises may motivate leaders to change the regime through two main mechanisms.
First, crises sometimes weaken various opposition actors, increase general distress and create
“windows of opportunity” for leaders to change the regime in a direction that they inherently
prefer. Democratically elected leaders who use crises as pre-text to conduct self-coups is
one example. Second, an economic crisis may sometimes also weaken the regime’s power
resources and help opposition actors to mobilize, threatening the regime with breakdown. In
such circumstances, incumbents might prefer to negotiate regime change with the opposition
as a “lesser evil”, to avoid direct confrontation.
In the following sections, we first present the general theoretical argument. Next, we
present two illustrative cases studies, which are selected to exemplify how each of the two
3
mechanisms contained in the argument may play out in practice, namely early-1990s Peru
and early-1990s Zambia. Thereafter, we discuss the core concepts and introduce the mea-
sures and data that we use in our large-n analysis. Before concluding, we present our
empirical analyses, first on an aggregated measure of regime transitions from within and
then on disaggregated measures capturing different types of such changes. We find a fairly
robust relationship between various measures of economic crises and the aggregate measure
of regime changes from within. When we disaggregate, we find a clear link with self-coups
and transitions from within that are not associated with liberalization. But we do not find
a clear relationship with incumbent-guided liberalization/democratization episodes. Thus,
our empirical analysis yields support for the proposed “window of opportunity” mechanism,
but not for the “lesser evil” mechanism suggested by, among others, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006).
2 Argument
Our argument consists of two proposed mechanisms, both of which suggest that an economic
crisis increases the probability of regime transition from within. These mechanisms relate to
how economic crises impact on the opportunities that incumbent elites have for changing the
regime—either through altering the resources or support of the incumbent, or the resources
or coordination abilities of opposition groups—or on the preferences that incumbents have
regarding deliberately altering the regime versus trying to maintain the status quo. Yet,
concerning the more specific nature of such preferences, the two mechanisms differ. One
mechanism—let’s call it the“window of opportunity”mechanism—suggests that crises create
opportunities for incumbent elites to transform the regime to one that they inherently prefer
over the status quo. The second, “lesser evil” mechanism suggests that crisis may induce
elites to transform the regime to one they find less desirable than the status quo, but more
desirable than the regime that could result from their inaction.
We specify and exemplify these mechanisms in the coming sections, which contain two
illustrative case studies. Briefly summarized, the first mechanism suggests that an economic
crisis, in certain situations, create a “window of opportunity” for leaders to “reform” the
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political regime in a direction that they inherently prefer. We illustrate this mechanism
with Peru and the self-coup by Alberto Fujimori. The second mechanism presupposes that
economic crises mobilize and empower opposition actors, thus creating incentives for sitting
leaders to enter negotiations about regime change with the opposition or otherwise set in
motion a managed change to avoid forced regime transition. In other words, economic crises
can pressure incumbents into accepting regime change, notably guided liberalizing regime
changes, as the lesser of two evils. In these instances, the incumbent is unlikely to inherently
prefer the post-transition regime to the pre-transition one, but the transition is nonetheless
accepted as the expected costs of resisting a transition are higher than the utility loss of the
guided transition (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2006). Several factors can play into
this calculation; notably, being thrown out of office through extra-constitutional means such
as a revolution or coup substantially increases risks of leaders experiencing death and other
forms of punishment (Goemans, 2008). We illustrate the second mechanism by the guided
liberalization occurring in early-1990s Zambia.
Common to both mechanisms are assumptions about how economic crises affect the
behavior of actors outside the incumbent regime elite. Several scholars have explicitly or
implicitly assumed that economic crises lead to coups d’e´tat, civil wars, and revolutions
largely because of the discontent they induce (or exacerbate) for either coup-plotters, rebels,
or the population at large. The link between economic crises and grievances in the popu-
lation, mediated by individuals experiencing income loss, unemployment, or high inflation,
is highlighted in various contributions (e.g., Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Such increased
grievances—especially if the regime is perceived to be responsible for the crisis—may in-
crease (elites’ perceptions of) risks of a forced regime breakdown brought about by external
actors. This, in turn, could spur incumbent elites to steer the country through a guided
regime transition to mitigate these grievances. However, aggrieved population groups could
also direct their anger towards other groups whom they perceive as responsible for their
distress, such as economic elite groups not associated with the regime, foreign business in-
terests, or foreign governments. Clever incumbents could then even take advantage of this
situation to change the regime in a direction they prefer.3
3This argument is agnostic to the specific incumbent motivation. Often, we surmise, increased personal
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Economic crisis can also alter the behavior of non-incumbents through other mechanisms.
Several contributions (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) highlight how economic crises
may function as coordination devices for collective action among different groups. Being
both demarcated in time and of a public nature, crises can serve as“coordination signals”, for
instance enabling citizens to take to the streets knowing they will not be alone in protesting
(see, e.g., Kuran, 1989). Expectations of such dynamics could also put pressure on incumbent
elites to reform the regime from within in order to avoid a revolution.
Finally, an economic crisis may alter the resources available to incumbents and to op-
position actors, thereby altering the power balance between them, depending on the nature
of the crisis and where the actors draw their resources from. If the regime’s core supporters
are agricultural elites whereas the opposition consists of industrial elites, as in many 19th
century European autocracies (Ansell and Samuels, 2014), an economic crisis that mainly
pertains to the production or prices of major agricultural export products should tilt the
power balance in favor of the opposition. Economic crises that reduce tax revenues may
render regime elites less capable of co-opting or diffusing threats by eating into funds used
for repression or buying support from key groups, be it through social policy spending
(Ponticelli and Voth, 2011) or patronage (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997b). This, in turn,
strengthens incumbent incentives to find other ways to maintain support, including regime
transitions from within.
In the following, we detail the two different mechanisms, or “paths”, through which
economic crisis may spur regime change. For both paths, we start out with an illustrative
case narrative, before we provide a short and more general, stylized description.
2.1 Path 1: Economic crises as windows of opportunity (Peru)
One case that illustrates how crisis can induce a transition from within, and more specifically
a self-coup, through providing the leader with a window of opportunity is the ascent of
Alberto Fujimori to autocrat of Peru on April 5th 1992. Known as an economic reformer
that promised to combat stagnation, Fujimori first came to power in 1990, after four years of
power or private economic gain are key motivations, but altruistic or idealistic leaders could pursue regime
changes intended to ensure “better governance”.
6
Figure 1: Yearly growth: Peru
negative GDP p.c. growth. Growth remained slow also in the two years before his self-coup
(see Figure 1). In total, Fujimori would govern Peru for ten years, eight of which after the
self-coup and without any credible electoral and parliamentary opposition.
Fujimori’s predecessor was Alan Garcia, a member of the centre-left American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) (Crabtree, 1992). Garcia’s five-year term in office was
characterized by a drastic and protracted economic downturn, resulting in a large spike
in poverty. Emphasizing nationalization and government interference, Garcia represented
rather different ideas on economic policy than his successor, Fujimori. This clear divergence
in economic platforms, and the negative experiences with crisis during the more left-wing
economic policies of Garcia, may have contributed to Fujimori’s popularity in the early
1990s in different segments of the Peruvian population. Alberto Fujimori, now often termed
neopopulist (Weyland, 2006), thus came to power in 1990, and did so initially through free
and fair elections.
Yet, Fujimori’s policies for dealing with the economic crisis he inherited remained very
controversial among opponents, contributing to the intensity of the conflict that eventually
provided the window of opportunity for Fujimori’s self-coup. After imposing a series of
strict austerity measures, the opposition was inflamed, and Fujimori eventually dissolved
Congress in the autogolpe of April 5, 1992, with substantial support from the military
branch. Subsequently, he revised the constitution and undertook a drastic process of eco-
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nomic liberalization without being curtailed by the checks and balances of the previous
democratic system (Mauceri, 2006).
Admittedly, the economic crisis that Peru had experienced, and the intense conflict over
what policies should be selected to resolve it, was not the only factor behind Fujimori’s 1992
self-coup. For it to succeed, a myriad of factors had to align, including the consolidation of
a sufficiently strong ruling coalition and, crucially, the support of the military. The military
had relinquished direct rule of Peru in 1980, but remained a critical political actor due to
years of counterinsurgency campaigns against the communist armed insurgency, Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path) (McClintock, 1984). Parallel with the economic downturn, po-
litical violence intensified over the 80s, and had spread from Sendero’s point of origin, the
Ayacucho region, to over thirty provinces across Peru (McClintock, 1989). Obando (1996)
argues that the mutual support between Fujimori and the military leadership was a “mar-
riage of convenience”, in which Fujimori was given political and fiscal power in return for
increased military control over the conflict with Sendero Luminoso. Therefore, the ongoing
political violence seems crucial for ensuring the military–Fujimori alliance that allowed for
the self-coup to be successful. Yet, the insurgency itself was intensifying, in part, by the
deteriorating living standards of peasants and merchants who increasingly dedicated them-
selves to Sendero Luminoso. While high-ranking members were dedicated to the ideological
cause, economic grievances was a core motivation for other members (see Berg, 1986; Por-
tugal, 2008). Hence, the protracted and deep economic crisis of Peru, at least indirectly,
contributed to opening up the window of opportunity for Fujimori’s self-coup.
Finally, a major factor in letting Fujimori execute a successful autogolpe was the popular
support he secured for suspending the constitution (Levitsky, 1999). Public opinion polls
suggested that almost 80 percent of the Peruvian population supported Fujimori’s authori-
tarian turn in 1992 (McClintock, 1996). As noted by Pastor and Wise (1992), these factors
where thoroughly intertwined with, and to an extent preconditioned by, the state of the
Peruvian economy—presumably, Fujimori’s popularity was affected especially by the very
poor economic performance experienced under his predecessor.
The Peruvian case illustrates the following general story: An economic crisis contributes
to erode support for institutions of the existing regime in key constituencies, thus making
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Figure 2: Yearly inflation: Zambia
it less controversial and risky for regime insiders to transform the regime to another system
that they prefer. Further, economic crisis may exacerbate tensions between opposing societal
forces, and alter the power balance between them, so that regime incumbents can more
easily push through their desired regime change, even when facing some opposition. In
sum, economic crises can spur grievances and alter the preferences and power resources of
different constituencies, thus creating a window of opportunity that clever elites can exploit
to change the political regime in a direction they inherently prefer.
2.2 Path 2: Economic crises creating pressure for change (Zam-
bia)
We illustrate the second path through which an economic crisis may spur regime change
from within with the end of United National Independence Party (UNIP) rule in Zambia in
1991. UNIP, under president Kenneth Kaunda, had ruled Zambia for 27 years—a formalized
one-party state had existed for 18 of them. Yet, in 1991, multi-party elections were held, and
a relatively peaceful transfer of power to the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)
followed (Baylies and Szeftel, 1992). A short account of the decline and liberalization of
UNIP’s rule follows.
The beginning of Zambia’s economic difficulties, which would only worsen over the next
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Figure 3: Yearly growth: Zambia
two decades, came in the mid-70s, after the international oil crisis and steep decline in
copper prices. As such, the discontent that surged in the late 80s—with many years of
negative GDP p.c. growth and a spike in inflation (see Figures 2 and 3)—had built up
over years, and economic grievances intertwined with other sources of disgruntlement. The
initial UNIP reaction to the visible discontent of the late 80s was to ban debate within the
party structure and tighten control over national media, including the two main national
newspapers (Bratton, 1992). Yet, these efforts did not prevent the intensification of politi-
cal engagement in civil society, the business community, and labour movement (VonDoepp,
1996). MMD was a coalition of these interests, with Frederick Chiluba, long time chairman
of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), as party president. ZCTU led the cam-
paign for a referendum on the restoration of multi-party politics, which President Kaunda
tentatively accepted in 1989. In June 1989, a government-imposed doubling of the price on
maize—presumably a direct response to the financial troubles the government now found
itself in—led to three days of looting and riots in Lusaka and several other towns.
Beyond domestic trends and pressure for change, international pressure also affected
political developments (as in several other African countries in the early 1990s; Bratton
and van de Walle, 1997a). The IMF, with whom the UNIP government had an uneasy
relationship, was one international actor applying pressure. Zambia’s debt/GDP ratio soared
from 90.9% in 1980 to 261.3% in 1990 (Bank, 1992)—contracting GDP p.c. during the 1980s
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helped fuel this development. After accepting IMF regulations to obtain sorely needed loans,
the Zambian government eventually broke with the IMF in 1987. Although the break only
lasted a short while, this worsened the regime’s ability to satisfy various popular demands
with spending (Bradshaw, 1993). After an extended period of negative growth, and presiding
over a poor and aid-dependent economy, the Zambian regime was vulnerable to pressures
both from international actors such as the IMF and internal opposition (Levitsky and Way,
2006).
It was in this context the (predecessor of) MMD solidified its push for immediate elec-
tions, and UNIP under Kaunda subsequently legalized political parties, but planned to stay
the course in the new multi-party regime by partaking in elections. The first multi-party
elections in Zambia since 1968 were held on 31 October 1991, giving MMD 74% of the vote
for the national assembly and Chiluba 76% of the vote for president (Macola, 2008; Bratton,
1992; Baylies and Szeftel, 1992). Kaunda received 24% of the vote for president and UNIP
received 25% of the national assembly votes, giving it 25 seats compared to the MMD’s 125.
The general story that the Zambian case illustrates, is one where economic crisis builds
up substantial pressure on the sitting regime (from various actors). Under such conditions,
the regime may ultimately opt to reform into what regime elites consider a less favourable
regime type than the status quo. They do so simply because this outcome, arrived at via
a guided regime transition, is preferable to (the perceived high-probability event of) forced
regime change by outside actors. The latter may not only lead to incumbent elites losing
power altogether, but dramatically increase risks of death or other punishment to former
leaders (Goemans, 2008). The pressures for change created by an economic crisis can come
from the signalling- and coordination functions that a crisis can play in uniting a fragmented
opposition, but also through increasing grievances with the regime—and thus the willingness
to fight it—in different population groups. Finally, a crisis may force change simply through
siphoning off the sitting regime’s financial resources, and thus weakening its ability to co-opt,
or effectively repress, crucial coalition partners and the wider populace.
11
3 Concepts, measures and data
3.1 Regime transitions from within
Following Djuve, Knutsen and Wig (2019), we define a political regime as the set of for-
mal and informal rules that are essential for selecting leaders (see also Geddes, Wright and
Frantz, 2014). A regime change is thus defined as a substantial change in these rules (for
a longer elaboration, see Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2019). A “regime change from within”
is a substantial change in the formal or informal rules for selecting leaders that is, at least
in part, guided by incumbent regime elites. The crucial distinction between mere policy
changes and regime changes from within thus rests on what threshold we use for categoriz-
ing substantial changes. There is an inherent trade-off between capturing more fine-grained
changes in (especially informal) rules that de facto alter a regime’s nature and sifting out
irrelevant policy shifts. We apply the same threshold and operationalization as Djuve, Knut-
sen and Wig (2019), which is lower—giving about twice as many regime changes for identical
country-year observations—than the one used by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Regime
transitions from within are often associated with government or leadership changes, such as
in 1991-Zambia. But, regime transitions from within can also occur without any changes to
the incumbent leadership, notably for non-democratizing transitions such as self-coups. In
these instances, small, incremental changes over protracted periods of time may sometimes
accumulate to a substantial shift in rules. We aim to capture also such changes, despite the
difficulties of pinning down the exact date of regime change.
The data for our dependent variable are from HRD, which is constructed to deal with
the tricky operational questions raised above. These data are described and evaluated in
Djuve, Knutsen and Wig (2019), and notes and sources are publicly available for all recorded
regime changes. The data were originally collected for 1789–1920 as part of Historical V-Dem
(Knutsen et al., 2019), but have later been expanded to 2018 and to cover more countries,
and are integrated as part of V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2017a). HRD comprises information
on more than 2000 political regimes with high temporal resolution, denoting the beginnings
and ends of regimes down to their precise dates in most cases. HRD also records the type of
regime breakdown, employing a 14-category scheme (see Appendix A). Types of breakdown
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are recorded on a single-selection variable, where the most important process leading to
breakdown is recorded, and a multiple-selection variable recording all relevant processes.
We rely on the single-selection variable when constructing our dependent variable. The 14-
category scheme covers, for instance, military coups, civil war, foreign intervention, popular
uprisings and the three categories of regime transition from within that we focus on here.
The three categories of transitions from within are self-coups, non-liberalizing incumbent-
guided transitions, and liberalizing incumbent-guided transitions. Liberalizing guided tran-
sitions are regime changes where the incumbent elite is directly involved in steering or ne-
gotiating the transition and that either substantially improve level of democracy in existing
partial democracies, or dismantle decisive components of existing autocracies. 1991-Zambia
exemplify the latter, as a one-party regime legalized opposition parties and introduced elec-
tions. Typical examples of the former include substantial suffrage extensions and removal
of restraints from non-elected executives (typically monarchs) on elected bodies (e.g., an
elected parliament). As discussed briefly above and in depth in Djuve, Knutsen and Wig
(2019), such rule changes must be of a certain magnitude and practical importance to reg-
ister as a regime change.
The other two types of regime change from within are other incumbent-guided tran-
sitions (not accompanied by political liberalization) and self-coups conducted by sitting
leaders. Admittedly, these two modes of regime breakdown are sometimes hard to distin-
guish in practice.4 We find it helpful to think of this distinction as a continuum ranging
from very clear self-coups (such as Fujimori’s self-coup in 1992), which lead the old regime
to be replaced by a more autocratic new one under the same leader(s), via difficult inter-
mediate cases where there may be some additional concentration of power in the leader’s
hands, to guided transitions between regimes, where the new regime is often no more auto-
cratic/democratic (or only slightly more autocratic/democratic) than the previous one. An
example of the latter is the end of the Fourth Republic in France 1959, instigated by Charles
de Gaulle after the Algiers crisis of 1958. HRD dates the transition to the effectuation of the
new constitution on January 8, 1959, with the beginning of the current semi-presidential
4Mitigating measurement error is therefore one benefit of combining these two categories. Thus, also
when testing our two theorized paths from economic crisis to transition from within, we collapse them into
a single “non-democratizing transitions” category.
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Figure 4: Frequency of polities (y-axis) by number of regime transitions from within through-
out a country’s history (as registered in the HRD data; x-axis).
Fifth Republic. Regarding the intermediate cases, these are often characterized by some
legislative action being made to transform the rules of the political game, for example re-
stricting the role of the opposition or introducing a specific head of state or new legislative
framework for the appointment of head of state. These changes may have (some) effects
on the concentration of power with the leadership and lead to a somewhat more autocratic
outcome, but stop short of a full-fledged self-coup.
In our main analysis, the three transition categories are grouped together when coding
our dummy on “regime transitions from within”. Guided transitions leading to political
liberalization make up 251/2021 regime breakdowns recorded in HRD (12.4%), whereas
self-coups account for 104/2021 (5.1%) and “other transitions from within” for 366/2021
(18.1%). Transitions from within thus make up more than a third of all regime changes.
Since many countries have time series extending back to the late 18th- or early 19th century,
and most others start in 1900 (see Appendix A for sample details), 75% of all countries have
two or more such transitions recorded, as displayed by the histogram in Figure 4. Mexico
tops the distribution with 16 regime transitions from within, six between 1812 and 1824 and
the latest one being the guided liberalization of the PRI regime in 2000.
Figure 5 presents time-series lines on the proportions of countries, globally, that experi-
enced at least one regime breakdown (of any kind) and at least one transition from within.
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Figure 5: Share of countries globally that experienced at least one regime breakdown, in a
year, and share of countries globally experiencing at least one regime transition from within,
in a year. The time series are generated with a Loess smoother, with a span of 0.075, on
annualized data.
The latter have made up a substantial share of all regime changes through most of modern
history, but the absolute and relative frequencies have varied, with two high-water marks
around 1960 and around 1990. Appendix Figure B.1 further details how transitions from
within have varied, historically, in different geographical regions. For instance, such tran-
sitions accounted for more than half of all regime changes in Western Europe and North
America during long stretches of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including several
guided liberalization episodes where incumbent elites expanded the franchise (e.g., Boix,
2003) or introduced parliamentarism and circumscribed the monarch’s powers (e.g., Con-
gleton, 2011).
3.2 Economic crises
Economic crises can have very different features and underlying causes—there are financial
crises, exchange rate-induced crises, or crises from crashes in the property market. Some are
associated with high inflation, others with high unemployment rates, and yet others with
both features simultaneously. Some crises are abrupt and short, others are more protracted
(as in the discussed Peruvian and Zambian cases). Nonetheless, one feature that is typical
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for economic crisis is strongly reduced, and even negative rates of, GDP p.c. growth. In
fact, the most common operationalization that economists use for a “recession” is negative
GDP p.c. growth for at least two consecutive quarters (of a year). Yet, GDP p.c. growth
is a continuous variable, and setting a threshold for what we should call an economic crisis
is inevitably an arbitrary decision. Our benchmark measure is therefore the continuous
measure of GDP p.c. growth in a year. Further, we test a dummy that distinguishes between
positive and negative growth in a given year, coding instances of GDP p.c. growth < 0 as 1
(economic crisis) and all other non-missing observations as 0. Alternative operationalizations
are dummies capturing lower than -3 and -5 percent annual GDP p.c. growth, hence using
more conservative thresholds for identifying crisis. In addition, we test dummies for crises
that require negative GDP p.c. growth over more than one year, in order to identify more
protracted crises only. Longer crises could lead to stronger pressures for regime change. For
instance, Lindvall (2017) highlights that longer crises are more likely than short ones to
affect various population groups and thus create economic distress for a larger share of the
population.
The GDP data are from (Fariss et al., 2017), who estimate (logged) income level by using
a dynamic latent trait model and drawing on information from different GDP datasets. We
use their estimates benchmarked in the long time series from the Maddison project (Bolt
and van Zanden, 2013). One benefit of using the Fariss et al. data is that the latent
model estimation mitigates various kinds of measurement error. A second benefit is that it
mitigates missing values by imputation, allowing us to extend our time series back to 1789.
Yet, we conduct robustness tests by using the original Maddison time series, which we then
linearly interpolate by assuming constant growth rates across intervals with missing data.
The extensive coverage of the GDP data allow us to capture numerous economic crises
and regime changes. Other key indicators of economic crisis, such as unemployment rates,
only have cross-country data extending a few decades back, and are thus not feasible for
the analysis presented below. However, one alternative measure with extensive time-series
coverage is annual inflation rate, with data from Clio-Infra (de Zwart, 2015). We construct
proxy measures of crises that capture episodes of high inflation, setting the thresholds for
our high-inflation dummies to > 50, > 100 or > 150 percent. Yet, since such thresholds are
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inevitably arbitrary, we mainly rely—as for GDP p.c. growth—on a continuous measure.
Given the highly skewed nature of the inflation variable, and the notion that adding another,
say, 100% to the inflation rate is likely more unsettling for consumers if inflation is initially
2% than 1,000,000%, we use a concave transformation. Specifically, we use ln(i+ imin + 1),
where i is the inflation rate and imin) is the minimum inflation rate (or, rather deflation
rate, since it is negative) in the sample.
3.3 Benchmark specification
Our benchmark specification is a logit regression with country-year as unit of analysis and
errors clustered by country to account for panel-specific autocorrelation. In this benchmark
we include a cubic polynomial of regime duration, following Carter and Signorino (2010),
to account for differential survival rates throughout the life-span of a political regime (see,
e.g., Svolik, 2012). We use the continuous measure of annual GDP p.c. growth as our main
independent variable and a dummy capturing (at least one) “regime change from within” in
a year as dependent variable. Our benchmark controls for a modest set of covariates that
may influence the probability of experiencing economic crisis as well as regime change from
within. These covariates include income level, operationalized as ln GDP p.c. (from Fariss
et al., 2017) and ln population (same source). Further, we control for degree of democracy
by including the Polyarchy index (Teorell et al., 2019) from V-Dem (Coppedge et al 2017a),
and its squared term. We include both the linear and squared term in order to model the
inverted u-curve relationship between level of democracy and regime breakdown found in
previous studies (e.g., Gates et al., 2006; Goldstone et al., 2010; Knutsen and Nyg˚ard, 2015).
All covariates are lagged one year after the dependent variable.
We further include either geographic region dummies, taken from (Coppedge et al.,
2017a), or country-fixed effects. These controls are intended to capture fairly stable, unit-
specific characteristics, for example geographic, climatic or political-historical features, that
simultaneously affect breakdown and correlate with economic crisis. Further, we include
year dummies to account for any (non-linear) time trends and global shocks that correlate
with both crisis and regime transitions from within. The addition of dummies for both
countries and years makes for a fairly stringent test, as we do not draw inferences from
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cross-country comparisons or comparisons across different time periods.
Our benchmark is intentionally sparse to mitigate the possibility for post-treatment bias.
Yet, several guided regime transition processes (that span multiple years) may be inherently
linked to change on the Polyarchy scale in the same year as the crisis occurs (i.e., in year
t − 1, if the transition is registered in t). Hence, even our sparse benchmark might suffer
from post-treatment bias, as Polyarchy scores can be affected by change on our dependent
variable. We therefore also report models without any controls except for the duration terms,
year-fixed effects, and the region/country dummies. In yet other specifications, introduced
in Section 4.2, we prioritize mitigating omitted variable bias over post-treatment bias, and
add extra controls to the benchmark.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Main analysis
Table 1 reports the benchmark described in the previous section. Model 1.1 is the most
parsimonious version without any controls except the cubic duration terms, year-fixed effects
and geographic region dummies. This sparse specification draws on 18,243 country-year
observations from 164 countries and the longest time-series extend from 1789–2014. Model
1.2 adds the (one-year lagged) time-variant controls, namely ln GDP p.c., ln population,
and the linear and squared terms of Polyarchy. Model 1.3 is similar to 1.2, but substitute
the region-fixed effects with country-fixed effects.
The results from these initial tests follow our expectations; GDP p.c. growth is negatively
correlated with probability of observing a regime transition from within in the subsequent
year. The predicted relationship from Model 1.1 is fairly sizeable. For instance, a change
in GDP p.c. growth from +5 to -5—when setting all other covariates to their respective
means—corresponds to the probability of observing a transition from within in t + 1 in-
creasing from 2.1 to 2.5 percent. A larger change, from +10 to -10, increases the predicted
probability from 1.9 to 2.8 percent (see Appendix Figure B.2). The coefficient is slightly
attenuated, also in terms of t-value, when we add the time-invariant controls in Model 1.2
(-0.014; t=-2.54) relative to in Model 1.1 (-0.019; t=-3.64). Yet, in both models the negative
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Table 1: Baseline model specifications: Aggregate transitions from within as dependent
variable
1.1 1.2 1.3
GDP pc growth -0.019*** -0.014* -0.008
(-3.64) (-2.54) (-1.14)
Log GDP pc -1.201* -2.487*
(-2.11) (-2.33)
Log pop size -0.378 -2.127
(-1.25) (-1.46)
Polyarchy 7.666*** 7.994***
(7.42) (5.81)
Polyarchy2 -10.548*** -11.571***
Cubic duration terms X X X
Year FE X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X
N 18243 13854 12986
ll -2147.798 -1747.586 -1707.491
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models
is the binary indicator on at least one transition in a year. Max time series is 1789–2014. All
independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted
from table.
relationship is statistically significant at 5%. This is not the case in Model 1.3, which adds
country-fixed effects instead of region-fixed effects. Here, the t-value declines to -1.1. Yet,
even if attenuated and insignificant, the predicted relationship remains at least moderately
sized; a change in growth from +5 to -5, with all other covariates at their means, corresponds
to an increase in the probability transition from within in t+ 1 from 1.7 to 2.0 percent. Yet,
we remind that this growth coefficient fails to pass conventional levels of significance, and
the relationship is thus not entirely robust.
4.2 Robustness tests
We conducted several extra tests to assess the sensitivity of our benchmark results. First,
we assess how sensitive results are to different operationalizations of economic crisis, using
alternative data sources and making alternative assumptions about the required depth and
length of economic contractions. Next, we run linear probability models (LPM) instead of
logit. Finally, we try out different sets of control variables to assess sensitivity.
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Figure 6: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for GDP p.c. growth, from models
resembling Model 1.2, Table 1, but with growth measured from t-10 to t+1
We start by employing the same measure of (continuous) GDP p.c. growth—replicating
Model 1.2, Table 1—but trying out different lag structures on the independent variables,
from t− 10 to t+ 1. Figure 6 the resulting growth coefficients and 95% confidence intervals.
We note three patterns: First, GDP p.c. growth in years t − 2 and t − 3 are also signifi-
cantly related to the outcome with the expected sign; growth in the relatively short-term, in
addition to the very short-term (one year prior), is associated with transitions from within.
Second, growth measured concurrently with regime change is positive and significant, which
may reflect that crises are likely to produce both regime change from within and higher
“rebound-growth” once the crises is over. Third, we did not theoretically expect growth
measured relatively far back in history to carry any independent effect on regime outcomes
in t. Indeed, growth is insignificant for all lags between t−4 and t−10. Hence, this analysis
on different lags and leads on GDP p.c. growth does at least not weaken the empirical
support for our argument.
We continue with a continuous growth measure and return to the t − 1 lag, but use
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Table 2: Baseline model specifications using Maddison data: Aggregate transitions from
within as dependent variable
3.1 3.2 3.3
GDP p.c. growth (Maddison) -0.020** -0.020** -0.022**
(-2.59) (-2.74) (-2.61)
Ln GDP p.c. -1.073 -5.122*
(-1.36) (-2.53)
Ln population size -0.650 -5.773*
(-1.53) (-2.56)
Polyarchy 8.297*** 10.321***
(6.44) (5.78)
Polyarchy2 -10.715*** -13.490***
(-6.78) (-6.48)
Cubic duration terms X X X
Year FE X X X
Region FE X X X
CountryFE X
N 12331 9014 7665
ll -1407.695 -1132.531 -1059.546
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models
is the binary transitions from within indicator. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year.
Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted from table.
GDP data from the Maddison project (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013) instead of Fariss et al.
(2017). This change reduces the number of observations from 18,243 country-years in Model
1, Table 1 to 12,331 in Model 1, Table 2. However, the Farris et al. time series are imputed,
and predictions are presumably poorer for observations without scores on any of the extant
GDP series, the most extensive one being Maddison. Hence, many error-prone observations
are likely dropped when using the Maddison data. This may be why results are at least
equally clear for the Maddison data in Table 2, despite the reduced sample. The GDP p.c.
coefficients are somewhat larger in size for all three model specifications—i.e., without time-
varying controls (3.1); with time-varying controls and region-fixed effects (3.2.), and with
time-varying controls and country-fixed effects (3.3)—when compared to the main results.
And, the coefficients are now statistically significant at 1% for all specifications.
Returning to the Fariss data, we tested several categorizations of economic crisis events,
based on a country’s recent GDP p.c. growth. As discussed in Section 3.2, we constructed
dummy variables requiring different thresholds on growth, i.e., requiring crises of different
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Table 3: Various dummies on economic crisis on aggregate transitions from within: Country
FE
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Dummy: Negative growth 0.071
(0.61)
Dummy: Growth under –3% 0.703***
(4.69)
Dummy: Growth under –5% 1.174***
(6.50)
Dummy: 2 yrs of neg. growth -0.128
(-0.91)
Dummy: 3 yrs of neg. growth 0.902*
(2.55)
Log GDP p.c. -2.803* -2.380* -2.064* -2.823* -2.680*
(-2.52) (-2.28) (-2.02) (-2.52) (-2.39)
Log pop size -2.304 -2.106 -2.092 -2.316 -2.308
(-1.62) (-1.51) (-1.53) (-1.63) (-1.60)
Polyarchy 7.215*** 7.212*** 7.262*** 7.228*** 7.205***
(5.99) (6.00) (6.03) (6.01) (6.00)
Polyarchy2 -10.690*** -10.690*** -10.763*** -10.687*** -10.671***
(-7.21) (-7.24) (-7.25) (-7.22) (-7.20)
Cubic duration terms X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Country FE X X X X X
N 14079 14079 14079 14079 14079
ll -1906.420 -1897.110 -1889.865 -1906.209 -1903.137
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models
is the binary transitions from within indicator. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year.
Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted from table.
depths, to be coded as a “1”. We also tested dummies requiring that the crisis extended
over several years to be coded as “1”. Table 3 presents results using the benchmark with
country-fixed effects, hence a fairly conservative model.5 Results are mixed in the sense that
some dummies—and please note that a positive value indicates a crisis—are statistically
significant with the expected sign, whereas others are not. Notably, a dummy registering
whether or not there was negative growth in year t− 1 is not systematically correlated with
probability of transition from within in t (Model 4.1). When using stricter requirements for
coding a crisis-year, for example requiring growth below -3% (Model 4.2) or -5% (Model
4.3), there is a strong and highly significant relationship. In other words, countries that
5Results are fairly similar when we use region-fixed effects; see Appendix Table B.2).
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Table 4: Linear Probability Model (LPM) on benchmark specification
5.1 5.2 5.3
GDP p.c. growth -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(-2.43) (-2.45) (-2.48)
Ln GDP p.c. -0.032* -0.055*
(-2.25) (-2.17)
Ln population size -0.008 -0.084*
(-1.07) (-2.15)
Polyarchy 0.136*** 0.132***
(6.58) (4.39)
Polyarchy2 -0.172*** -0.187***
Cubic duration terms X X X
Year FE X X X
Region-FE X X X
Country-FE X
N 18243 16452 16452
R2 0.010 0.036 0.047
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models
is the binary transitions from within indicator. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year.
Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted from table.
experience severe economic crises are systematically more likely to observe a transition from
within than other countries. The same is true if we consider situations where at least three
preceding years had negative growth (Model 4.5), finding a clear relationship with regime
transitions from within when coding only longer periods of economic contraction as crises.
However, this result is not robust to using a two-year requirement for consecutive negative
growth (Model 4.4).
The picture is similar if we consider inflation instead of GDP p.c. growth. These tests,
which are reported in Appendix Table B.3, show that our continuous (log-transformed)
measure is systematically correlated with transitions from within in t+ 1. However, dummy
variables coding crisis as very-high inflation episodes, are sensitive to the particular threshold
used. A 100-percent threshold gives clearer results than a 50-percent threshold, for example.
Moreover, the results using such high-inflation episode dummies only show significant results
in models including country-fixed effects.
Next, we substituted our logit models with OLS models, or so-called Linear Probability
Models (LPM). Table 4 reports LPM-versions of our benchmark without time-varying co-
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variates (5.1), or with such covariates and either region- (5.2) or country-fixed effects (5.3).
Independent of choice of controls, the growth coefficient is always negative and significant
at 5%. The point estimates suggest that a 10-point drop in GDP p.c. growth rate, for
example from +5 to -5, increases the chance of observing a regime transition from within
in t + 1 by about 1 percentage point. This is a sizeable effect—the share of country-years
in our sample that observed such transitions was 2.3 percent. LPM specifications also give
very similar results to the logit models when testing the various crises dummies constructed
and discussed above (Appendix Table B.4).
Finally, we tested several models with additional controls (Appendix Table B.7), in-
cluding natural resource income (data from Haber and Menaldo, 2011), urbanization (via
Coppedge et al., 2017a), and proxies of corruption and state capacity from V-Dem. We an-
ticipated that some of these specifications would be affected by post-treatment bias; for
example, crisis could affect corruption, which, in turn, could affect regime breakdown.
Nonetheless, the growth coefficient and t-value are virtually unchanged when controlling
for urbanization, corruption, or impartial public administration. The coefficient is slightly
attenuated, and turns insignificant, when controlling for natural resources income. How-
ever, further analysis reveals that the attenuated coefficient and t-value result from the re-
duced sample (8659 instead of 13854 observations); when re-run on the restricted sample,the
benchmark results are almost identical (also in terms of t-value) to the model controlling
for natural resources. Hence, our benchmark results are quite robust to choice of controls.
4.3 Disaggregating regime change from within
So far we have employed an aggregated measure that coded different kinds of regime changes
driven by incumbent regime elites as “transitions from within”. Yet, as our discussions in
the theory and data sections imply, this broad category aggregates across several distinct
processes of regime change. It is far from given that economic crisis should display a sim-
ilar empirical relationship to these different processes of regime change. Even though our
theoretical argument suggests that crises should enhance all the types of transitions from
within, this is, ultimately, an empirical question. Indeed, the lack of robustness for the
aggregate relationship discussed above could signal that we are aggregating and estimating
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Table 5: Disaggregating the dependent variable: Guided transitions without liberalization
and self-coups in leftmost columns and guided transitions with liberalization in rightmost
columns
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6
Non-liberal.. Non-liberal. Non-liberal. Liberalizing Liberalizing Liberalizing
GDP p.c. growth -0.021*** -0.010 0.010 0.015*
(-3.51) (-1.48) (1.91) (2.08)
Dummy: Growth under –3% 1.080*** 0.025
(6.56) (0.08)
Ln GDP p.c. -1.738* -4.180** -4.100** -0.004 -0.358 0.107
(-2.25) (-2.65) (-2.74) (-0.00) (-0.22) (0.07)
Ln population size -0.758 -3.077 -3.291 0.313 -0.608 0.396
(-1.93) (-1.63) (-1.88) (0.54) (-0.48) (0.29)
Polyarchy 4.819*** 4.788** 3.875** 13.399*** 14.874*** 13.975***
(3.66) (2.63) (2.60) (7.05) (5.57) (5.63)
Polyarchy2 -6.826*** -6.772** -5.768** -17.968*** -22.235*** -21.004***
(-4.09) (-3.02) (-2.99) (-7.69) (-6.68) (-6.81)
Cubic duration terms X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Region-FE X X
Country FE X X X X
N 10690 8706 9919 9585 6516 7681
ll -1126.652 -1081.386 -1202.341 -715.235 -629.857 -724.989
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Duration
terms, constant and fixed effects omitted from table.
across heterogeneous relationships. We therefore turn to specifications run on two more
fine-grained dependent variables, coding regime change due to guided liberalization, on the
one hand, and other guided transitions and self-coups, on the other, as separate transition
events.
Table 5 reports these tests, with self-coups and guided transitions not leading to politi-
cal liberalization as outcomes in the three leftmost columns, and guided transitions leading
to liberalization—the kind of regime change envisaged after crisis by, e.g., Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006)—in the three rightmost columns. While not entirely robust (see the bench-
mark with country-FEs in Model 6.2), various regressions—including the benchmark with
region-fixed effects (6.1) and when using the growth below -3 percent dummy in addition
to country-FEs (6.3)—show a strong relationship between crisis and those transitions from
within that do not lead to liberalizing outcomes. This observation is consistent, for example,
with our theoretical mechanism highlighting that opportunistic incumbent elites may use
crises as windows of opportunity to conduct self-coups or engage in other types of regime
transitions (e.g., from a military regime to a personalist regime) that they view as beneficial.
In contrast, there is no evidence of the expected relationship for guided transitions leading
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to liberalizing outcomes. These can be elite-guided transitions related to expansions of
the franchise or the introduction of free and fair multi-party elections by regime elites in
initially closed systems. If anything, higher growth seems positively correlated with such
guided, liberalizing transitions when using the continuous measure. But, the overall pattern
is that of a non-robust relationship. While regime elites may be forced during a crisis to
change the regime to another autocracy that they do not prefer (for instance by imposing
additional constraints on the leadership in a previously personalistic regime by a dominant
regime party; see, e.g., Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018), the guided liberalizing regime
transition (highlighted also by Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) was the archetypical example
in our theoretical discussion of a “forced” regime transition from within. Hence, we surmise
that these disaggregated results fail to provide empirical support for the second, “lesser evil”
pathway from crisis to guided transition.
One possible reason for the lack of evidence for this pathway might be that incumbents
can respond effectively to pressures from crises by using other strategies. If liberalization
of the regime is a very undesirable outcome for incumbents, they may be willing to pursue
rather expensive policies to co-opt or appease opposition both within their ruling coalition
and the general public. Examples of such policies could include investments in various local
or national public goods, but targeted pension programs (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2018)
is one type of redistributive policy that is often introduced or expanded in order to co-opt
specific groups in non-democratic regimes. Thus, one potential explanation for the lack of an
observed correlation between economic crises and incumbent-guided liberalizing transitions
is that incumbent elites might fend off threats spurred by a crisis by pursuing particular,
redistributive policies, without overseeing a liberalization of the regime.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical argument suggesting that economic crises can provide
impetuses for incumbent elites to change the existing regime, and that crises may do so
through two different mechanisms. First, economic crises sometimes create conditions that
give elites a “window of opportunity” to alter the regime towards one that they inherently
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prefer over the status quo. Second, crises sometimes spur mobilization among dangerous
opposition actors, leading strategic incumbent elites to preemptively transform the regime to
diffuse opposition threats and avoid even worse outcomes such as a revolution or coup. We
test implications from this argument by using new data on more than 700 regime transitions
from within, covering about 200 countries and the years 1789–2018. While results are not
entirely robust, we mainly find the expected relationship between (various measures of)
economic crises and regime transitions from within. When subsequently disaggregating
these transitions, we find that economic crises induce elite-guided regime transitions that do
not result in political liberalization, but also, more surprisingly, that crises do not enhance
liberalizing, guided regime transitions.
Our study and findings point to different avenues for future research. First, the un-
expected lack of a clear relationship between crises and incumbent-guided liberalization
episodes means that a well-known and widely held hypothesis from the theoretical democrati-
zation literature (notably, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) lacks empirical support. Granted,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) predict that the effect of an economic crises on elite-guided
democratization may depend on other factors such as income inequality. Future work could
thus investigate potential interaction effects between crises and more structural economic
factors in inducing such regime change. Alternatively, we noted above how targeted, re-
distributive policies can sometimes be a sufficient response to an economic crises to diffuse
various pressures against the regime (and thus allow elites to avoid guided liberalization).
Choices, and potential trade-offs, between co-optation through redistributive policies (and
preferably policies that credibly guarantee redistribution also in the future; see Knutsen and
Rasmussen, 2018) versus institutional change are intriguing topics for future study. More
generally, we lack empirical studies into the potential determinants of elite-guided liberal-
ization episodes, and future studies can employ the data and set-up used here to investigate
such determinants.
While guided democratic transitions have attracted more attention by scholars histor-
ically (e.g., O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986), democracy researchers have re-
cently started focusing more on “self-coups”. As highlighted by Svolik (2015), self-coups are
an increasingly common mode of democratic breakdown, and has recently outpaced mili-
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tary coups as a threat to democratic regime survival. Recent analysis describe how elected
leaders, often in an incremental manner, concentrate power in their own hands and disman-
tle institutional checks on their power until, one day, the regime is no longer democratic
(Lu¨hrmann and Lindberg, 2019; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Przeworski, 2019). Despite
the recent focus on describing the various steps of self-coups and some analysis into how
strong parliaments can guard against such regime change (e.g., Fish, 2006), the determi-
nants of successful self-coups remain poorly understood. Going beyond the role of economic
crisis and elaborating on why some democracies experience self-coups and others do not, is
therefore an important topic for future research.
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Online Appendices to “Economic Crisis and Regime Transitions
from Within”
In these appendices we provide additional information on the regime data used in our em-
pirical analysis as well as different additional robustness tests and extensions not reported
in the paper. More specifically, in Appendix A we first list the questions and accompa-
nying information from the V-Dem indicators incorporated in the Historical Regimes Data
(Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2019), which we use to measure transitions from within in the
paper. Appendix A also contains a full list of the country-year observations included in
HRD. Appendix B contains the various tables with robustness tests that are mentioned, but
not displayed in tables, in the paper, plus descriptive statistics on the observed frequency
of transitions from within across different countries.
i
A Questions and observations included in HRD
Regime interregnum (v3regint)
Question: Does there exist an identifiable political regime?
Clarification: This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no
political regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead
to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a
civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes
in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that
partial control over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which
is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.
0. Yes
1. No
Regime name (v3regname)
Question: What is the name of this regime?
Clarification: If the regime is commonly referred to with a particular name in the
international literature, such as “The Second French Republic”, then this name should be
used. The exception to this rule is if the regime is only referred to by the name of the nation
(e.g. “North Korean regime”). If multiple names are used interchangeably in the literature,
select one of them. If there is no common name, try to provide a name that would be
informative to scholars that have knowledge of the political history of the relevant country.
If the time period in question is characterized by a so-called interregnum period, where no
political regime is coded, please provide the name “Interregnum X-Y”, where X denotes the
country and Y denotes the order (in time) of this interregnum period among all such periods
(within the coded time series) for this particular country. E.g., the first coded interregnum
period of Spain should be coded “Interregnum Spain-1”.
Answer type: Text
ii
Regime start date (v3regstartdate)
Question: When did the political regime obtain power?
Answer type: Day/Month/Year
Regime end date (v3regenddate)
Question: When did the political regime lose power?
Answer type: Day/Month/Year
Regime end type (v3regendtype)
Question: Could you specify the types of processes (one or more) that led to the end
of the regime?
0. A military coup d’etat.
1. A coup d’e´tat conducted by other groups than the military.
2. A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
3. Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d’e´tat)
4. Natural death of the sitting leader
5. Loss in civil war.
6. Loss in inter-state war.
7. Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)
8. Popular uprising.
9. Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by
sitting regime leaders
10. Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under
the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization)
11. Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime
leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for
the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1 to 10
iii
12. Other process than those specified by categories 0 to 11.
13. Regime still exists
Answer type: Single selection
Regime end type, multiple selection (v3regendtypems)
Question: Could you specify the type of process that you consider the most important
in leading to the end of the regime?
0. A military coup d’etat.
1. A coup d’e´tat conducted by other groups than the military.
2. A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
3. Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d’e´tat)
4. Natural death of the sitting leader
5. Loss in civil war.
6. Loss in inter-state war.
7. Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)
8. Popular uprising.
9. Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by
sitting regime leaders
10. Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under
the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization)
11. Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime
leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for
the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1 to 10
12. Other process than those specified by categories 0 to 11.
13. Regime still exists
Answer type: Multiple selection
iv
Country Start year End year Country Start year End year
Afghanistan 1747 2016 Lithuania 1918 2016
Albania 1912 2016 Luxembourg 1714 2016
Algeria 1830 2016 Macedonia 1991 2016
Angola 1885 2016 Madagascar 1797 2016
Argentina 1776 2016 Malawi 1891 2016
Armenia 1922 2016 Malaysia 1867 2016
Australia 1788 2016 Maldives 1887 2016
Austria 1713 2016 Mali 1890 2016
Azerbaijan 1922 2016 Mauritania 1904 2016
Baden 1112 1871 Mauritius 1818 2016
Bangladesh 1971 2016 Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1755 1871
Barbados 1663 2016 Mexico 1784 2016
Bavaria 1623 1871 Modena 1780 1861
Belarus 1991 2016 Moldova 1991 2016
Belgium 1785 2016 Mongolia 1911 2016
Benin 1895 2016 Montenegro 1785 2016
Bhutan 1865 2016 Morocco 1757 2016
Bolivia 1784 2016 Mozambique 1836 2016
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 2016 Namibia 1884 2016
Botswana 1885 2016 Nassau 1806 1866
Brazil 1763 2016 Nepal 1768 2016
Brunswick 1495 1918 Netherlands 1747 2016
Bulgaria 1877 2016 New Zealand 1823 2016
Burkina Faso 1919 2016 Nicaragua 1823 2016
Burma/Myanmar 1782 2016 Niger 1922 2016
Burundi 1897 2016 Nigeria 1914 2016
Cambodia 1863 2016 Norway 1784 2016
Cameroon 1960 2016 Oldenburg 1774 1871
Canada 1838 2016 Oman 1749 2016
Cape Verde 1879 2016 Pakistan 1947 2016
Central African Republic 1920 2016 Panama 1903 2016
Chad 1914 2016 Papal States 1775 1870
Chile 1787 2016 Papua New Guinea 1888 2016
China 1722 2016 Paraguay 1776 2016
Colombia 1717 2016 Parma 1748 1861
Comoros 1841 2016 Peru 1543 2016
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1885 2016 Philippines 1898 2016
Congo, Republic of the 1882 2016 Poland 1764 2016
Costa Rica 1823 2016 Portugal 1777 2016
Croatia 1941 2016 Prussia 1701 1871
Cuba 1763 2016 Qatar 1916 2016
Cyprus 1878 2016 Romania 1789 2016
Czech Republic 1918 2016 Russia 1762 2016
Denmark 1784 2016 Rwanda 1897 2016
Djibouti 1896 2016 Sao Tome´ and PrA˜ncipe 1753 2016
Dominican Republic 1700 2016 Sardinia 1720 1861
East Germany 1949 1990 Saudi-Arabia/Nejd 1744 2016
East Timor 1896 2016 Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach 1741 1871
Ecuador 1819 2016 Saxony 1356 1871
Egypt 1787 2016 Senegal 1904 2016
El Salvador 1823 2016 Serbia 1730 2016
Eritrea 1896 2016 Seychelles 1903 2016
Estonia 1918 2016 Sierra Leone 1896 2016
Ethiopia/Abyssinia 1769 2016 Singapore 1867 2016
Fiji 1874 2016 Slovakia 1939 2016
Finland 1789 2016 Slovenia 1991 2016
France 1768 2016 Solomon Islands 1893 2017
Gabon 1920 2016 Somalia 1889 2016
Gambia 1888 2017 Somaliland 1888 2016
Georgia 1922 2016 South Africa 1884 2016
Germany 1867 2016 South Sudan 2011 2016
Ghana 1901 2016 South Yemen 1839 1990
Greece 1821 2016 Spain 1700 2016
Guatemala 1697 2016 Sri Lanka 1815 2016
Guinea 1895 2016 Sudan 1899 2016
Guinea-Bissau 1879 2016 Suriname 1816 2016
Guyana 1831 2016 Swaziland 1890 2016
Haiti 1697 2016 Sweden 1789 2016
Hamburg 1712 1871 Switzerland 1712 2016
Hanover 1803 1866 Syria 1918 2016
Hesse-Darmstadt 1567 1871 Taiwan 1895 2016
Hesse-Kassel 1567 1866 Tajikistan 1991 2016
Honduras 1823 2016 Tanzania 1916 2016
Hungary 1722 2016 Thailand 1782 2016
Iceland 1814 2016 Togo 1916 2016
India 1784 2016 Trinidad and Tobago 1889 2016
Indonesia 1800 2016 Tunisia 1782 2016
Iran/Persia 1751 2016 Turkey/Ottoman Empire 1730 2017
Iraq 1920 2016 Turkmenistan 1991 2016
Ireland 1801 2016 Tuscany 1737 1861
Italy 1861 2016 Two Sicilies 1759 1861
Ivory Coast 1895 2016 Uganda 1894 2016
Jamaica 1670 2016 Ukraine 1991 2016
Japan 1615 2016 United Arab Emirates 1971 2016
Jordan 1921 2016 United Kingdom 1701 2016
Kazakhstan 1991 2016 United States 1788 2016
Kenya 1895 2016 Uruguay 1825 2016
Korea, North 1945 2016 Uzbekistan 1785 2016
Korea, South 1637 2016 Vanuatu 1906 2016
Kosovo 1999 2016 Venezuela 1777 2016
Kuwait 1756 2016 Vietnam 1771 1945
Kyrgyzstan 1991 2016 Vietnam, North 1945 2016
Laos 1893 2016 Vietnam, South 1945 1975
Latvia 1918 2016 Wu¨rttemberg 1089 1871
Lebanon 1918 2016 Yemen 1716 2016
Lesotho 1884 2016 Zambia 1911 2016
Liberia 1821 2016 Zanzibar 1698 2016
Libya/Tripolitania 1711 2016 Zimbabwe 1890 2016
Liechtenstein 1866 2016
Table A.1: Observations included in the Historical Regime Data. For more detailed discus-
sion on the sample, see Djuve et al. (2019). While HRD follows the time series from V-Dem
for each country (1789 as first year), regimes that controlled power at the first day of the
V-Dem time series are coded all the way back to their inception.
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B Descriptive statistics and tables with robustness tests
Table B.1: Frequency table: Number of polities by freq. of transitions from within
Directed transitions Polities Percentage
0 18 9.1
1 32 16.3
2 32 16.3
3 30 15.3
4 27 13.8
5 13 6.6
6 13 6.6
7 10 5.1
8 7 3.5
9 4 2.0
10 5 2.6
11 2 1.0
12 2 1.0
16 1 0.5
Total 196 100
vi
Figure B.1: Regime changes from within as proportion of all regime changes, per geographic
region. The time series are generated with a Loess smoother, with a span of 0.1, on annu-
alized data.
vii
Figure B.2: Predicted probabilities of transition for values -9 to +9 of GDP p.c. growth,
from Model 1, Table 1. All other covariates at their means.
viii
Table B.2: Growth dummy variations on aggregate transitions from within: Regional FE
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
Dummy: Negative growth -0.035
(-0.31)
Dummy: Growth under –3% 0.603***
(4.36)
Dummy: 2 yrs of neg. growth -0.231
(-1.78)
Dummy: 3 yrs of neg. growth 0.810**
(2.61)
Log GDP pc -1.680** -1.566** -1.698** -1.636**
(-2.93) (-2.82) (-2.97) (-2.87)
Log pop size -0.516 -0.475 -0.546 -0.517
(-1.80) (-1.65) (-1.91) (-1.79)
Polyarchy 7.302*** 7.242*** 7.302*** 7.280***
(7.52) (7.51) (7.53) (7.52)
Polyarchy2 -9.964*** -9.838*** -9.980*** -9.908***
(-8.05) (-8.02) (-8.05) (-8.01)
Duration terms X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Region-FE X X X X
N 14843 14843 14843 14843
ll -1955.657 -1948.079 -1954.202 -1952.604
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models
is the binary transitions from within indicator. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year.
Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted from table.
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Table B.4: LPM: Growth dummy variations on aggregate transitions from within
1 2 3 4 5
Dummy: Negative growth 0.001
(0.19)
Dummy: Growth under –3% 0.028***
(4.09)
Dummy: Growth under –5% 0.064***
(5.28)
Dummy: 2 yrs of neg. growth -0.005
(-1.49)
Dummy: 3 yrs of neg. growth 0.034*
(1.99)
Log GDP pc -0.063* -0.057* -0.052 -0.063* -0.060*
(-2.20) (-2.06) (-1.89) (-2.18) (-2.08)
Log pop size -0.058 -0.053 -0.056 -0.059 -0.058
(-1.47) (-1.37) (-1.44) (-1.50) (-1.48)
Polyarchy 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.122***
(4.37) (4.36) (4.37) (4.38) (4.38)
Polyarchy2 -0.179*** -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.180*** -0.179***
(-6.57) (-6.48) (-6.50) (-6.60) (-6.58)
Duration terms X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Country-FE X X X X X
N 17676 17676 17676 17676 17676
R2 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.044 0.044
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models
is the binary transitions from within indicator. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year.
Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted from table.
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Table B.5: Baseline model (Region FE) with different lags on the explanatory variables
lag=1 lag=0 lag=2 lag=3
GDP pc growth -0.014* 0.011* -0.018** -0.019**
(-2.54) (2.47) (-2.84) (-2.72)
Log GDP pc -1.201* -1.921* -0.988 -0.879
(-2.11) (-2.35) (-1.61) (-1.31)
Log pop size -0.378 -0.425 -0.471 -0.590
(-1.25) (-1.22) (-1.42) (-1.82)
Polyarchy 7.666*** 10.412*** 6.708*** 5.878***
(7.42) (7.36) (5.90) (4.78)
Polyarchy2 -10.548*** -10.840*** -9.601*** -8.861***
(-8.01) (-6.51) (-6.85) (-5.92)
Duration terms X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Region FE X X X X
N 13854 11920 12375 11022
ll -1747.586 -1149.215 -1459.041 -1259.999
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models
is the binary transitions from within indicator. Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted
from table.
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Table B.6: Baseline model (Country FE) with different lags on the explanatory variables
lag=1 lag=0 lag=2 lag=3
GDP pc growth -0.008 0.009 -0.021** -0.034*
(-1.14) (1.95) (-3.11) (-2.31)
Log GDP pc -2.487* -3.746** -2.547* -2.064
(-2.33) (-2.72) (-1.97) (-1.37)
Log pop size -2.127 -2.657 -1.616 -1.053
(-1.46) (-1.83) (-1.14) (-0.68)
Polyarchy 7.994*** 12.449*** 6.256*** 5.199**
(5.81) (6.72) (3.84) (2.81)
Polyarchy2 -11.571*** -12.999*** -9.776*** -9.042***
(-7.02) (-6.12) (-5.30) (-4.37)
Duration terms X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X X X
N 12986 10086 11255 9670
ll -1707.491 -1092.489 -1406.663 -1206.282
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models
is the binary transitions from within indicator. Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted
from table.
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